As the United States pivots toward protectionism and reciprocal tariffs under the Trump administration, China is aggressively opening its doors through tariff-free policies. It’s already been done in 53 of Africa’s 54 countries, the exception being Lesotho, which continues to maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

This diverging global landscape poses a profound dilemma for African nations: is the West becoming an unreliable partner, effectively pushing the continent deeper into Beijing’s orbit? Or does this shifting dynamic offer Africa an opportunity to rewrite the rules of engagement?

In the second installment of a two-part interview with Crux Now, Professor Franklin Nnaemeka Ngwu of Lagos Business School dissects the risks of the emerging U.S.-China rivalry.

He warns that without “strategic autonomy,” Africa risks becoming a passive pawn in a geopolitical tug-of-war, leading to technological fragmentation and a loss of sovereignty.

From the decline of AGOA to Europe’s struggle to balance sustainability with market access, Professor Ngwu argues that the path to a “just and fair” economic relationship lies not in choosing sides, but in leveraging the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to negotiate as a unified bloc.

With Africa’s population projected to hit 2.5 billion by 2050, he underscores the urgent need to move beyond fragmented markets and build the industrial infrastructure necessary to turn a demographic boom into a powerhouse of production.

What follows is the full text of the interview.

Crux Now: While China is opening its doors to Africa, the United States is moving toward protectionism and reciprocal tariffs under President Trump. From an African perspective, does this shift signal that the West is becoming an unreliable partner, effectively pushing Africa deeper into China’s orbit?

Professor Franklin Nnaemeka Ngwu: On 18 May 2000, the U.S. Congress enacted the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) to enable eligible sub-Saharan African countries (SSA) to export approximately 7,000 products to the United States duty-free. This development led to an increase in U.S. imports of goods from Sub-Saharan African countries, from $8.2 billion in 2001 to $66.3 billion in 2008, before gradually declining to $33.6 billion in 2025 for SSA, with total imports from Africa declining to $43.0 billion in 2025.  So, with the U.S. elimination of AGOA benefits resulting from its moves towards protectionism and the imposition of reciprocal tariffs on African countries, the West automatically becomes a less accommodating or unreliable trading partner. The implication of this move is that China will be seen by African countries as a better destination for African goods previously exported to the United States. As more African countries divert their exports to China to boost their foreign earnings, China’s relative influence is likely to increase.

How can African nations navigate this polarized environment without becoming pawns in a U.S.-China rivalry? Is there a risk that Africa will be forced to choose sides, and if so, what are the potential consequences for regional stability?

To avoid becoming pawns in the U.S.-China rivalry, Africa needs to pursue strategic autonomy, that is, non-alignment or adopt a multi-alignment stance, rather than being a passive target in their competition. We need to use AfCFTA to negotiate as one bloc, harnessing our collective market of over 1 billion people, resources and economic influence to shape the terms of engagement and demand better terms for technology transfer and infrastructure projects rather than settling for poor bilateral deals.

But the risk of having to choose sides to maintain regional balance remains a concern. The U.S.-China rivalry could lead to technological and economic fragmentation, in which China’s digital infrastructure, coupled with Western financial networks, could divide the African continent.

If we are forced into either camp, we may face internal political polarization and lose our sovereignty because national development will be sacrificed to satisfy the U.S. or China’s demands. This means the African continent would not be able to freely trade across borders, which would hinder the industrialization and integration necessary to lift the continent out of dependence.

Historically, Europe has been Africa’s largest trading partner. Given China’s aggressive moves and the U.S.’s retreat into protectionism, where should Europe stand? Should Europe be competing with China on market access, or should it be focusing on higher standards and deeper political integration?

Trade relations between Africa and Europe, dating back to April 2000, have gradually evolved, with Europe being Africa’s largest trading, economic, and political partner. But despite this unique partnership, the European long-dominance in Africa now faces a challenging moment amid China’s growing influence. No doubt, Europe is unlikely to compete with China successfully purely through aggressive market access or infrastructure financing, as China offers faster and more flexible financial support without imposing political conditions. Additionally, China is more likely to fund risky projects compared to the EU. Europe’s comparative advantage lies in promoting deeper political integration, sustainable development, institutional strengthening, technology transfer, education, and long-term industrial partnerships through its Global Gateway initiative and AfCFTA. This approach must be properly combined with fair trade and the reduction of policies perceived as protectionist or paternalistic by Africa, such as green policies that restrict coffee export to EU market, corporate due diligence, and procurement rules. Failure to adopt a balanced approach may push African countries toward China as a more practical partner.

Does Europe risk falling behind in influence if it does not offer similar trade concessions, or is the European model—focused on sustainability and governance—still more viable for long-term African stability than the Chinese model?

Europe risks losing its influence in Africa if it does not offer competitive trade, investment and infrastructure support, which China is rapidly providing. In the world of politics, influence follows economic benefit. Many African governments will see China as an attractive partner, as it builds infrastructure quickly, provides finance with minimal political conditions, and expands markets more quickly than many Western countries. If Europe fails to act economically, Africa may become even more dependent on China.

Though the European model of sustainability and governance through the Global Gateway is likely to be the best for African countries in the long run because it favors value addition by investing in local factories and infrastructure, which enables Africa to process its own products, Europe must ensure that its high standards are not turned into “green protectionism” that excludes African producers if it is to succeed.

If the EU sets high standards and, at the same time, controls exports from Africa by adopting protectionist policies, it will certainly lose ground in the long run. Therefore, combining sustainability with trade, investment, technology transfer, and supporting the African Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA) is the best bet for Europe.

Africa’s population is expected to hit 2.5 billion by 2050. This represents a massive workforce and consumer base. Beyond tariff exemptions, what structural changes must African leaders implement now to ensure this growing population has jobs, rather than simply becoming a market for foreign imports?

The first solution is for Africa to move beyond the export of raw materials and develop manufacturing industries using locally sourced minerals, agricultural products and so on. The provision of a stable electricity supply, safe, sustainable and inclusive transport infrastructure, ports and digital infrastructure is crucial to achieving this goal. We must make industrialization our core goal. Secondly, African governments must promote and invest massively in education, vocational training, and the skills required in the workplace. Thirdly, governments should support SMEs in accessing finance and navigating regulations and administrative processes, since SMEs create job opportunities.

Fourth, AfCFTA is equally crucial because industrial growth can be constrained by a fragmented national market, whereas a large market can attract capital and create the scale needed to develop the African region’s industrial base. Lastly, African leaders must restore governance by addressing corruption and political instability, as coups d’état scare away foreign investment.

Can Africa truly negotiate “just and fair” economic relations if it negotiates as 54 fragmented nations rather than a unified bloc?

Professor Franklin Nnaemeka Ngwu: The success of AfCFTA is the existential pivot point for African sovereignty. Without it, the continent remains a collection of 54 fragmented markets, easily manipulated by global powers. If African nations negotiate individually, they will lack the leverage to demand “just and fair” terms and be forced into lopsided “debt-for-resource” deals or transactional trade concessions that prioritize foreign strategic interests over local industrialization.

However, if they negotiate as a unified bloc, Africa will transform from a passive recipient of external policies, such as China’s much-discussed zero-tariff policy or America’s reciprocal demands, into a global price-setter that can mandate technology transfers and regional value-chain investments as prerequisites for market access. In this case, the AfCFTA will serve as a collective shield that channels external rivalries into competitive development rather than economic subjugation and turns the African continent’s massive demographic growth into a singular, unignorable force at the global negotiating table.